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Abstract 
This paper evaluates a UK pilot study designed to test whether a means-tested conditional 
cash transfer paid to 16- to 18-year-olds for staying in full-time education is an effective way 
of reducing the proportion of school dropouts. The transfer’s impact is substantial: in the first 
year, full-time education participation rates increase by around 4.5 percentage points while the 
proportion receiving two years of education increases by around 6.7 percentage points. Those 
receiving the full payment have the largest initial increase in participation and some evidence 
is found suggesting that part of the effect can be explained by liquidity constraints.  
                                                                                                                                                          
publication] through [3 years hence] from Carl Emmerson, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 7 
Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE, UK (e-mail: cemmerson@ifs.org.uk).  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 3 
I. Introduction 
Education has been at the centre of policies intended to promote growth both in the 
developing world and in wealthier countries. It is seen as a key to development and to the 
ability of a country to keep up with the fast-moving technological change.
1 The recent 
increase in the returns to education in the US
2 and the UK
3 has reinforced this view. 
Education is also seen as a way for individuals to escape poverty and welfare (and possibly 
crime) dependency, and this perception has motivated numerous policies worldwide that 
promote education as a long-run solution to these problems.  
The most recent figures show just 76 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds with upper-
secondary education in the UK as of 2006, which is 11 percentage points lower than the 
corresponding figure for the US despite continuing problems with dropout rates in the US, 
particularly US cities.
4  
There has been worldwide focus on school dropout rates and a number of policies 
have been devised to help reduce them. One of the key policy changes in most OECD 
countries after the Second World War was to introduce free secondary-school education and 
to increase the compulsory school-leaving age. The timing and pace of these reforms varied 
tremendously across countries, and in the US the most important reforms actually occurred 
before the Second World War.
5 In the UK, fees for state secondary schools were abolished by 
the Education Act 1944 (the Butler Act) and the compulsory school-leaving age was increased 
from 14 to 15 in 1946 and then from 15 to 16 in 1974, where it remains today. In the US 
today, the compulsory school-leaving age ranges from 16 to 18;
6 for the remaining 29 OECD 
countries, it ranges from 14 to 18.
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Making secondary education free and increasing the compulsory school-leaving age 
had an effect on school dropout and completion rates, and a number of these reforms have 
been analyzed in previous research.
8 In recent years, a number of countries, both developed 
and developing, have introduced means-tested conditional grants in an attempt to encourage 
students to stay in school, rather than simply raising the compulsory school-leaving age. 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become an important policy option that may 
well become a permanent feature in a number of countries. Examples include PROGRESA in 
Mexico
9 and Familias en Acción in Colombia.
10 Indeed, such programs have now started in 
about 20 developing countries worldwide and their scope often extends beyond education 
outcomes.
11  
The interest in these programs extends beyond developing countries. A CCT system 
has been in operation in Australia since 1988
12 and the Opportunity NYC program is now 
being piloted in New York.
13 In the UK, a CCT program focused on participation in full-time 
education – the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) – has been rolled out on a national 
basis since September 2004. The EMA is a means-tested program that subsidizes children to 
remain in school for up to two years beyond the statutory age in the UK.  
The results reported in this paper are based on data from the first cohort of the EMA 
pilot study, which started in 1999 in a number of areas in England and preceded the national 
roll-out. The target population was pupils who completed their last year of compulsory 
education (Year 11) in the summer of 1999.
14 Estimating the impact of this program provides 
valuable information on whether such CCTs, which effectively reduce the cost of education, 
actually reduce school dropout rates, which at present are the central policy concern.
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such, the results can help guide policy and provide new evidence on the importance of 
financial incentives in shaping education choices. 
Evidence on the impact of the opportunity cost of education can be found in the 
literature on education choice: Willis and Rosen (1979), and more recently Heckman, 
Lochner, and Taber (1999) and Todd and Wolpin (2003), are examples of education choice 
models that allow for the opportunity cost of education measured as lost earnings.
16 Some of 
the existing direct evidence on the importance of upfront monetary incentives for school 
participation comes from the PROGRESA experiment in Mexico
17 and from the Familias en 
Acción program in Colombia.
18 Both programs establish significant and large effects for 10- 
to 17-year-olds, but in a very different context from the pilot study examined here.
19 
In the work presented here, the impact of the EMA is found to be quite substantial, 
especially for those who receive the maximum payment. The CCT increases the initial 
education participation of eligible males by 5.0 percentage points and of eligible females by 
4.0 percentage points. In the second year, the CCT increases the proportion staying in full-
time education for two years by 7.4 percentage points for eligible males and 5.9 percentage 
points for eligible females, suggesting that the effect of the policy is to increase not only initial 
participation but also retention within full-time education. The initial effects are largest for 
those who receive the maximum payment. It is estimated that around two-thirds of individuals 
who stayed in education were drawn from inactivity rather than paid work. The effect of the 
EMA is found to be largest for children with lower levels of prior educational achievement.  
Beyond estimating the effects of incentives on education participation, another key 
issue concerns understanding the mechanism by which subsidies operate. A CCT such as the 
EMA changes the opportunity cost of education. Thus, from an individual’s perspective, even Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 6 
if it is optimal not to participate under the pre-policy environment, it may become optimal to 
do so post-policy. The main mechanism that motivates policy, and indeed the presumption of 
policy-makers, has been that low levels of education participation are due to financial 
constraints rather than being the outcome of an informed choice in an unconstrained 
environment.
20 The desirability of a CCT in this case would be much greater because it could 
improve efficiency.  
To say something about this, the impact of the CCT on those living in owner-occupied 
housing is compared with the impact on those living in rented accommodation. The parents of 
the former are unlikely to be liquidity constrained because they are relatively more likely to 
have access to either financial assets or credit, not least because it is relatively straightforward 
for them to borrow against the house; whether they are willing to provide the funds to their 
children, of course, is another matter.
21 A larger (9.1 percentage point) and statistically 
significant impact of the policy is found on participation in education among those in rented 
accommodation compared with a smaller (3.8 percentage point) and not statistically 
significant impact on those in owner-occupied accommodation. However, the 5.3 percentage 
point difference between these two estimates is not statistically different from zero (p-value = 
12 percent). Therefore the extent to which the impact of the policy is due to credit constraints, 
rather than an unconstrained price effect, remains unclear. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, the program and its variants and the data 
used to evaluate the program are described. In Section III, the evaluation methodology is 
discussed. The results are discussed in Section IV along with some robustness checks, whilst 
concluding remarks are offered in Section V. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 7 
II. Background and Data 
The EMA pilots were launched in September 1999 in 15 out of the 150 local education 
authorities (LEAs)
22 in England. The scheme paid a means-tested benefit to 16- to 18-year-
olds who remained in full-time education after Year 11,
23 when education ceases to be 
compulsory (at 16 years of age approximately). The benefit could be claimed for up to two 
years (or three for young people with special educational needs) and could be used to attend 
any form of full-time post-16 education, whether academic or vocational. In this paper, the 
effects of the EMA on individuals who first became eligible for it in September 1999 are 
considered.
24 
Four different variants of the EMA were piloted and these are outlined in Table 1. The 
basic EMA (variant 1) was piloted in eight urban areas and one rural area. Variants 2, 3, and 4 
were all piloted in two urban areas. In each area, the maximum EMA weekly payment (£30 or 
£40, which was disregarded for the purposes of both income tax and welfare payments) could 
be received by young people whose parents’ incomes were £13,000 or below.
25 The benefit 
was tapered linearly for family incomes between £13,000 and £30,000, with those from 
families earning £30,000 receiving £5 per week. No payment was made for families with 
income in excess of £30,000. In addition, at the end of a term of regular attendance, the child 
would receive a non-means-tested retention bonus (£50 or £80).
26 The children also received 
an achievement bonus on successful completion of their course examination. To put these 
amounts in context, the median net wage among those who opted for full-time work in the 
sample was £100 per week. Thus the maximum eligibility for the EMA, depending on the 
variant, replaces around a third of post-tax earnings. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 8 
The program was announced in the spring of 1999, just before the end of the school 
year, and the lateness of the announcement means that it could not have impacted on a child’s 
Year 11 examination results.
27 The data used to evaluate the program are based on initial face-
to-face interviews with both the parents and the children and on follow-up annual telephone 
interviews with the children. The data-set was constructed so as to include both eligible and 
ineligible individuals in pilot and control areas. The data in this paper are from nine urban 
pilot LEAs, which were selected by the government on the basis of having relatively high 
levels of deprivation, low participation rates in post-16 education, and low levels of 
attainment in Year 11 examinations, and nine urban control LEAs, which were selected by the 
authors of this paper on the basis of having similar participation rates in full-time education in 
the recent past (both unconditionally and conditional on observed background characteristics 
of the young person and their parents) and, as far as possible, being geographically close to a 
pilot area.
28 A map of England showing the location and proximity of the nine urban pilot and 
nine urban control areas used in this study is shown in Appendix 1.  
The first interview was conducted at the beginning of the school year in which the 
CCT became available. Respondents were informed that the purpose of the survey was to 
investigate the destinations of 16- to 19-year-olds after they had finished compulsory 
schooling, with the same survey instrument used in both pilot and control areas. The 
proportions of the initially selected sample that yielded usable data were very similar in the 
pilot and control areas (54.6 percent and 56.4 percent respectively). In the following year, the 
same students (but not parents) were followed up using a telephone interview. Attrition 
between the first and second interviews is discussed in Section IV.B and Appendix 4. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 9 
In addition to information on the child’s current economic activity, the data-set 
contains a wealth of variables relating to family income (which is used to estimate whether or 
not the child would be eligible for the EMA were they to reside in an EMA area and continue 
in full-time education), family background (such as parents’ economic activity, occupation, 
and education), childhood events (such as ill health and mobility), and prior school 
achievement. Administrative data on the quality of schooling in the child’s neighborhood and 
other measures of neighborhood quality measured prior to the introduction of the EMA were 
also collected.
29  
Table 2 provides some pre-reform neighborhood statistics for the pilot and control 
areas, while Appendix 2 provides definitions of each of the neighborhood variables used in 
the analysis.
30 Larger values of these indices point to a greater level of deprivation. For the 
sake of comparison, the average indices and their standard deviation for the whole of England 
are also shown. Based on this information, it is clear that the pilots and controls are in more 
deprived areas and remarkably close to each other relative to the overall variation in England. 
The control areas were selected on the basis of similar socio-economic characteristics, and of 
similar levels and trends of education participation for the 16–18 age group. As can be seen 
from Table 2, the characteristics of the treatment and control areas are very similar indeed, 
with pilot areas tending to be slightly more disadvantaged. Indeed, the (proxy for the) 
aggregate non-school-participation rate pre-reform is just less than 3 percentage points higher 
in the pilot areas than in the control areas. However, some of the differences between pilot and 
control areas are statistically significant. This highlights the importance of appropriately 
weighting the control group, because if these pre-reform differences are not taken into Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 10 
account, it is likely that the impact of the EMA on participation in education would be 
underestimated. 
As explained in Section III, the evaluation methodology is based on the assumption of 
selection on observables and uses matching methods. Thus to control for the small differences 
between pilot and control areas, observed individual-level data from the survey as well as the 
administrative and local-area data are used. The variables used include individual-based 
characteristics on prior achievement, household income, parental occupation and education, 
household composition, and ethnicity; they also include childhood variables on early health 
problems, early childcare and grandparental inputs, special needs, and geographic mobility in 
early life. Publicly available data on the pre-reform quality of the child’s nearest Year 11 state 
school
31 and distance to the nearest Year 12 state educational provider (post-16 education) 
have also been controlled for.
32 The means of the remaining variables used in the analysis are 
provided in Appendix 3. 
III. The Evaluation Methodology  
The outcome of interest in this paper is full-time participation in post-compulsory schooling, 
which is Years 12 and 13. The focus is on the impact of financial incentives on the entire 
target population – that is, the population of those fully or partially eligible for the CCT as 
well as the ineligible population (see further discussion in Section IV). In each case, the 
outcomes are compared relative to an appropriate control group. 
Although the treatment and control areas are very well matched, the distribution of 
characteristics is not identical, as would be expected if a large-scale randomization had taken 
place; some of the differences are statistically significant, albeit small. To allow for the fact Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 11 
that this was not going to be a randomized experiment, the panel data were designed to 
include a large array of individual and local-area characteristics. These should control for any 
relevant differences in the treatment and control areas before the program was introduced, 
thus making the assumption of selection on observables and the matching approach credible. 
Conditional on the observable characteristics, it is assumed that the assignment to treatment is 
random.
33 
To estimate the impact of the program on first-year outcomes, three mutually exclusive 
outcomes of interest are defined: full-time education, work, and not in education, 
employment, or training (NEET). To do this, a demographic group of interest is taken – for 
example, boys whose family income implies eligibility for a full EMA award were they to live 
in an EMA pilot area and participate in full-time education. Using data from this group only, a 
probit model is used to estimate the propensity score – that is, the probability of an individual 
residing in an EMA pilot area as opposed to residing in an EMA control area, given their 
observed characteristics. Based on this estimated propensity score, common support across 
treatment and control observations is checked for. Because of the way the data collection was 
designed, in practice there are no problems of common support and only a handful of 
observations are dropped (see the sample sizes in Tables 3 and 4).
34 The impact is then 
estimated using kernel-based propensity score matching,
35 a multinomial probit, and a linear 
regression model. These are all estimated on the same sample that satisfies the common-
support conditions. In the multinomial probit and linear regression models, individual 
characteristics (discussed in the previous section and listed in Appendix 3), a dummy variable 
for whether or not they reside in an EMA pilot area, and interactions between this dummy 
variable and all of the other individual characteristics are included. These models are therefore Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 12 
called fully interacted multinomial probit and fully interacted OLS (ordinary least squares) 
respectively. They produce a set of heterogeneous effects of the policy, similar to the 
propensity score matching approach. The averages of these heterogeneous effects with respect 
to the distribution of characteristics for those living in the EMA pilot areas are reported and 
the results are interpreted as the estimated impact of treatment on the treated. The three 
models (propensity score matching, fully interacted multinomial probit, and fully interacted 
OLS) produce almost identical estimates of the average impact of the EMA on those who 
were treated.  
Using the second wave of data, estimates of the impact of the EMA on being in full-
time education for two years, one year, or no years past the compulsory school-leaving age are 
calculated. The estimates are produced using propensity score matching as well as a fully 
interacted ordered probit, fully interacted multinomial probit, and fully interacted linear 
regression. Again, all models produce almost identical point estimates of the average impact 
of the EMA on those who were treated. 
The only difference between the different estimation procedures is the precision of the 
estimates. Hence, for the remainder of the paper, the fully interacted linear regression 
approach is used as it is the easiest to implement and gives the most precise results.
36 The 
characteristics used include variables relating to family income and background, childhood 
events (such as ill health and mobility), and prior school achievement, which are all described 
in Appendix 3, as well as administrative data on the quality of schooling in the child’s 
neighborhood, other measures of neighborhood quality, and performance at the school level 
measured prior to the introduction of the EMA.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 13 
As a final step, some sensitivity analysis is also carried out. In one experiment, 
aggregate school participation data for 16-year-olds including eligible and ineligible pupils are 
used because aggregate statistics do not measure outcomes for eligible pupils alone.
37 In the 
second experiment, the change in school participation between the young person and their 
next oldest sibling in pilot and control areas is examined, controlling for a number of 
characteristics. The reasons that this variable is not included in the main evaluation methods 
are that not all children have older siblings and that the time-varying covariates measured, 
including income, relate to the date of the survey – that is, when the younger sibling was 
deciding whether to continue in education or drop out. Nevertheless, these sensitivity analyses 
confirm the results found with matching. 
In all cases, the standard errors allow for clustering at the LEA level, which is the unit 
of treatment. For the linear regression, analytical standard errors are used. For propensity 
score matching, the fully interacted multinomial probit, and the fully interacted ordered probit 
models, standard errors are calculated using the block bootstrap.
38 
IV. The Results 
A. Impact of the EMA on Year 12 Destinations 
Table 3 shows estimates of the impact of the EMA (overall and by sex) on young people’s 
initial decisions to remain in full-time education, to move into employment or training, or to 
be NEET. The table compares the results obtained when one uses the kernel-based propensity 
score matching technique, fully interacted multinomial probit, and fully interacted linear 
regression as well as those obtained by a simple comparison of means.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 14 
The EMA has had a positive and significant effect on post-compulsory education 
participation among eligible young people. The overall estimate is around 4.5 percentage 
points
39 from a baseline of 64.7 percent in the matched sample of controls.
40 The third and 
fifth rows of the table show that, as a result of the policy, inactivity declined by 3.0 percentage 
points and work by 1.5 percentage points. These point estimates indicate that a large 
proportion of the increased school participation originates from those who are otherwise not 
working, although this finding should be taken with some caution, given the standard errors. 
This result is important because it shows that, to a large extent, the policy is displacing 
individuals not from paid work but from financially unproductive activities, thus implying an 
overall lower financial cost of providing this incentive to education. This does raise the issue 
of the quality of individuals attracted to education by the CCT, since they seem to be largely 
those with little opportunity cost. However, as shown later, they tend to stay in full-time 
education for the whole two years of the CCT. Moreover, given the regulated nature of the 
education institutions they have to attend, one can hypothesize they are receiving valuable 
training. Ultimately, however, this can only be evaluated using eventual labor market 
outcomes, which are not available for this pilot study. 
The effects are larger for males, who have lower participation rates, than for females. 
However, the difference is not significant at conventional levels.  
B. Impact of the EMA in the Second Year (Year 13) 
So far, the analysis has concentrated on the impact of the EMA on initial destinations in Year 
12, the first post-compulsory year. However, the EMA is available for two years. Thus an 
important question is whether the impact of the EMA persists in the second year, significantly 
altering the entire path post-16. Education (whether academic or vocational) at Years 12 and Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 15 
13 typically consists of courses lasting two years. It is therefore interesting to see whether 
individuals, having sampled post-compulsory schooling as a result of the EMA, may have 
subsequently decided to drop out before Year 13. To answer this question, concentration turns 
to individuals observed for a second year. For this group, the impact of the EMA on staying in 
full-time education for two years, one year, or no years (in other words, leaving school at the 
minimum school-leaving age) is assessed.
41 
When considering whether the policy has led to longer-term increases in participation, 
the second wave of data for the cohort is used. However, there has been some attrition: about 
25 percent of the original sample was lost in the follow-up. Appendix 4 shows that the 
likelihood of remaining in the sample is higher for those with incomes that would make them 
eligible for the EMA relative to the rest. However, the pattern of attrition is the same for the 
treatment and control areas, possibly implying that attrition has mainly changed the overall 
population composition rather than led to biases for the population being considered. 
Appendix 4 reports the results of running a probit on the determinants of attrition. This shows 
that those who come from families earning less than £13,000 per annum (that is, those in the 
pilot and control groups who are defined as fully eligible) are slightly less likely to drop out of 
the panel but there is no difference conditional on this eligibility between pilot and control 
areas. These results suggest that attrition was not directly related to the EMA. When the 
impact of the EMA in the first year is re-estimated using only the sample of those who do not 
drop out of the panel, very similar estimates of the overall impact of the EMA on full-time 
education participation are obtained.
42 Whilst this is reassuring, it is also clear that the 
distribution of observed characteristics has changed as a result of attrition in the second wave. 
In particular, the individuals who did not drop out of the sample tended to originate from a Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 16 
relatively advantaged family background (see Appendix 4) and were more likely to be in 
school in wave 1 of the data. In this sense, the population used to look at the longer-term 
outcomes is different from the one used to look at the shorter-term outcomes. However, it 
should be stressed that issues relating to the impact of attrition are only relevant when one 
looks at the longer-term effects of the program.  
Table 4 shows the impact of the EMA based on the division of the population into the 
three mutually exclusive groups described above: two years of full-time education, one year of 
full-time education, and no years of full-time education after the minimum school-leaving age. 
Again, all of the estimation methods give reassuringly similar results. The discussion refers to 
the last column of results, which is based on the fully interacted linear regression technique. 
The important conclusion that comes from the table is that the EMA has been particularly 
effective in increasing the proportion of students staying in school in both Year 12 and Year 
13, and thus it is shown to have long-term effects. The estimated impact is slightly larger than 
for the first year (although again not significantly so). This result is important because it 
indicates that those drawn into education due to the EMA are committed to it. They do not 
just sample it only to find that it is not for them and drop out a few months later. A formal test 
of the impact of the EMA on retention (the proportion of those in full-time education in Year 
12 who stay on in Year 13) finds that the EMA increased retention rates by 4.1 percentage 
points from 77.6 percent to 81.7 percent. This effect is statistically significant at conventional 
levels.
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C. Impact of the EMA in Year 12, by Eligibility Group 
In this section, the impact of the EMA is estimated separately for those who are estimated to 
be potentially eligible for a full award and those who are estimated to be potentially eligible Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 17 
for only a fraction because their parents have an income higher than £13,000. The impacts 
may be different for the two groups for a number of conflicting reasons. First, if the CCT 
award is lower, it is likely to have a smaller effect. Second, the individuals who receive a 
lower CCT do so because they come from a better-off background; this may make them more 
likely to go to school in the first place and thus may also affect their sensitivity to upfront 
monetary incentives. With this policy design, it is not possible to distinguish one effect from 
the other. Thus Table 5 distinguishes between full eligibility, partial eligibility, and 
ineligibility to see whether the impact of the EMA differs according to whether a person was 
fully or only partially eligible and to see whether there were any spillovers to those in the 
ineligible group. 
Just over 47 percent of individuals are estimated to have been eligible for the 
maximum EMA payment, around 31 percent eligible for partial payment, and 22 percent not 
eligible. All eligible individuals were entitled to the full bonuses.  
Among those who were estimated to be eligible for a full EMA award, the EMA 
increased full-time education participation in Year 12 by 6.7 percentage points. For those 
estimated to be eligible for only a partial award, the corresponding figure is 1.2 percentage 
points (and not statistically significant at conventional levels). The p-value for their difference 
is 2.5 percent. Thus it is possible to say with reasonable confidence that the response of those 
fully eligible is larger than the response of those on the taper. A survey of education policy in 
England by Johnson (2004) has highlighted that one of the key aims of policies such as the 
EMA is to improve post-compulsory staying-on rates for children from deprived social 
backgrounds. The combination of a more generous payment and possibly their greater 
responsiveness to the payment points to a success of the policy in this dimension.
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Similarly, for ineligible individuals, the overall effect is very small (+0.7 percentage 
points) and not statistically significant at conventional levels, indicating that the spillover 
effects, at least in the short run, are not important.  
D. Does the Impact Vary by Prior Academic Achievement? 
It has already been shown that the EMA has its largest impact on children from relatively 
lower-income families who are able to qualify for the maximum award (Table 5). Another key 
question is whether children with low prior academic achievement can be encouraged to stay 
in school longer, possibly improving their skills before labor market entry. Thus, in Table 6, 
results split into low and high prior educational achievement are presented, where the sample 
is those eligible for a full EMA award only.
45 The EMA seems to affect primarily those with 
low prior educational achievement. However, this is perhaps not so surprising, given that the 
post-compulsory-school participation rate is much higher for those with high prior 
achievement. It does point out, however, that the increase in participation comes primarily 
from the lower ability group and is consistent with the earlier results showing that a large 
proportion of the increase in participation comes from those who would not otherwise be in 
paid work (Table 3 and Table 5). This may raise the question of whether the returns to 
education for this group are sufficiently large to justify the program, an issue that cannot be 
resolved with the available data. 
E. Credit Constraints? 
The estimates imply that the EMA has a relatively large impact on the education participation 
decisions in both Year 12 and Year 13, with a substantial effect on completing two years of 
post-compulsory schooling. A key question, which is directly relevant for understanding the Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 19 
way the policy works and for evaluating its merits, is whether the estimated effect is due to 
liquidity constraints or is simply the response to the ‘distorted incentive’ induced by the CCT. 
In general, most pupils have no direct access to savings. Most pupils need to borrow to fund 
education, if only because living expenses have to be covered, and, in practice, such funding 
typically comes from the parents since it is unlikely that a young person of 16 will have access 
to capital markets. Part of the parental funding will be motivated by straight altruism: if the 
parents value the child’s utility, they will be willing to fund education that will improve the 
life-cycle welfare of the child,
46 although the amount they will fund will not normally be the 
optimal level from the perspective of the child. If the child can commit to repay some of the 
funds, the parents may be willing to advance even more. Otherwise, the child will be 
effectively liquidity constrained. In addition, parents with little or no assets and low income 
may in fact be unable to provide adequate funding, possibly being liquidity constrained 
themselves, leading the child to work instead of attending school. This is the primary concern 
of policy-makers. 
Thus there are two alternative ways that the policy can have led to the increases in 
participation. One is a simple price distortion: by subsidizing education, its market price has 
been artificially lowered and children who would not otherwise attend school do so. This can 
be shown to be the case in a household that is altruistically linked or if the child is acting as an 
individual.
47 In this case, their private returns to education (net of costs) might be low. The 
other additional mechanism is that the CCT alleviates a liquidity constraint and children 
obtain more education now that a market distortion against education has been (at least 
partially) corrected. Under the null of no liquidity constraints, the child has access to all the 
funding required for their optimal level of schooling. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 20 
To get a handle on this issue, a long tradition in the consumption literature
48 is 
followed. The sample is split by assets, the idea being that those with assets are not liquidity 
constrained. The measure of assets used is house ownership, since families that own a house 
are relatively more likely to have access to financial assets or credit – not least as it would be 
relatively straightforward for them to release equity by borrowing against the house. Under the 
null hypothesis, it is assumed that once the plethora of socio-economic characteristics, ability, 
and local variables have been controlled for, house ownership is not correlated with the 
perceived costs of, or returns to, schooling. 
Given this assumption, a comparison is made between the impact of the policy on 
those living in an owner-occupied house and the impact on those living in rented 
accommodation (pre-policy). The key assumption here is that house ownership in itself does 
not lead to different responses to financial incentives, other than because it implies different 
access to funds.
49 Under the null, those in rented accommodation will react in the same way as 
those in owner-occupied housing because in both cases they were able to obtain the optimal 
amount of schooling pre-policy. Post-policy, the price of education is distorted and this affects 
both groups in the same way. Under the alternative, however, those in rented accommodation 
will have two reasons to increase education: first, they will now have the opportunity to fund 
education when before they could not; second, they will face the price distortion. Overall, 
those in rented accommodation should respond more to the CCT. 
The results of this test are presented in Table 7. The point estimate of the impact of a 
full EMA award is 9.1 percentage points for non-owner-occupiers, while the estimated impact 
for owner-occupiers is substantially smaller (3.8 percentage points). The difference between 
the two coefficients is significant at the 12 percent level. Therefore, while the point estimates Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 21 
indicate the importance of liquidity constraints, the standard error of the difference in the 
effects between the two groups is a bit too large for a firm conclusion.  
This hypothesis of liquidity constraints, if true, has two implications for policy. First, 
were the difference in outcomes due to the presence of credit constraints, then the policy 
would have much stronger grounds for support, as it would suggest that lack of finances leads 
to under-education of children from low-income families. Second, irrespective of the presence 
of credit constraints, the policy could be more effectively targeted on asset holdings (although 
not without introducing further long-run distortions). 
The liquidity constraints story does not sit comfortably with the fact that most of the 
increase in schooling comes from a reduction in unpaid activities rather than paid work. This 
does highlight the price distortion idea as a stronger possibility. However, the fact that the 
low-asset people respond much more may also point to an alternative interpretation:
50 some 
young people are discounting the future returns from education too heavily and therefore 
placing relatively too much weight on the upfront costs of remaining in school. If these 
individuals were disproportionately more likely to reside in rented rather than owner-occupied 
accommodation, then it might also explain why those in the former group respond more 
strongly to the EMA and, potentially, why (if anything) these young people seem to have been 
drawn from the group not in education, employment, or training as opposed to being drawn 
from those in paid work. 
F. Sensitivity Analysis 
As a final robustness check, the results from two sensitivity tests are presented, both using a 
difference-in-differences approach. In the first case, the impact is estimated using aggregate 
school participation data. In the second, the impact is estimated by comparing the behavior of Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 22 
children in the survey with that of their next oldest sibling who were too old to be eligible for 
the EMA. 
1. Aggregate Data 
This section presents simple difference-in-differences estimates based on aggregate school 
participation data for 16-year-olds. Three post-policy periods are compared to the one pre-
policy period (1998) where there is a complete set of data. In reading these results, note that 
the proportion of fully eligible individuals is about 47 percent. Including those partly eligible 
(that is, on the taper) increases the proportion to 78 percent. Under the assumption that the 
policy had no effect on ineligible individuals, the estimated effect on all individuals needs to 
be multiplied by 1.3 in order to estimate the impact of the EMA on those eligible for it.  
The three difference-in-differences estimates for 1999, 2000, and 2001 are respectively 
2.7, 2.3, and 4.7 percentage points, always with 1998 as the baseline.
51 Multiplying these 
estimates by 1.3 gives effects of 3.5, 3.0, and 6.1 percentage points respectively, which are 
remarkably close to the effect obtained from the individual data of 4.5 percentage points 
(Table 3), and certainly within the 95 percent confidence interval.  
2. Using Older Siblings 
An alternative approach, which allows one to focus more closely on the group of interest and 
at the same time to control for characteristics as in the main analysis, is to use difference-in-
differences, with the next oldest sibling of the children in the pilot and control areas as a 
comparison group. This allows examination of the change in participation between the current 
cohort and the older siblings in the pilot and control areas, controlling for observed 
characteristics. A full set of cohort and area dummies are included. The estimated effect of the Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 23 
EMA using this approach is 8.4 percentage points (with a standard error of 2.6), which is 
larger than the effect reported above. The difference is not significant at conventional levels.
52 
The smaller sample has made the estimate less precise, but it offers support for the significant 
effect of the EMA. 
Finally, successive difference-in-differences across siblings reaching the statutory 
school-leaving age before the period when the policy was in place are carried out. In all 
previous periods, this placebo ‘effect’ is not statistically significant. In the final period, when 
the policy was in place, a positive and statistically significant effect is obtained, again 
corroborating and strengthening the results. 
G. A Back-of-the-Envelope Cost–Benefit Calculation 
If the strong impact of the EMA is due to liquidity constraints, then even in the absence of any 
externalities to education, a positive welfare effect of the policy could be expected. However, 
this is hard to measure because there is no measure of the individual costs of education, and 
nor is it easy to measure the distortionary effects of raising funds for the CCT. Nevertheless, 
the results of a simple, back-of-the-envelope calculation are presented. 
The EMA increased the percentage of individuals from income-eligible families 
completing two years of post-compulsory education by 6.7 percentage points, from 54.3 
percent to 61.0 percent. In the first year (second year), one-third (two-thirds) of this increase 
was from individuals who would otherwise have been in paid employment.
53 This means that 
those brought into education would need to experience a real increase in future earnings of 6.2 
percent as a result of the additional two years of education for the program to break even, 
allowing for the opportunity cost of education.
54 Allowing £3,000 for the extra annual cost of 
educating those who stay on in secondary education
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education for the two years to 7.7 percent. Research into the returns from staying on in post-
compulsory education suggests that the returns are in fact 11 percent for males and 18 percent 
for females.
56 There may well be other benefits of the policy: the government might value the 
redistribution to lower-income families with children; infra-marginal individuals may reduce 
hours of work and increase effort put into education; there may be crime reductions. Many of 




Conditional cash transfers have become very popular as a way of improving participation in 
schools. One such policy intervention, and probably unique in scope in a rich industrialized 
country, is the Education Maintenance Allowance in the UK. Despite a steady increase, the 
participation in education following completion of compulsory schooling in the UK remained 
relatively low before its introduction. Since September 2004, the EMA program has been 
rolled out nationally. 
The results in this paper imply that the scope for affecting education decisions using 
CCTs can be substantial. More specifically, they imply that the EMA has significantly raised 
the stay-on rates past the age of 16. The initial impact is around 4.5 percentage points, with no 
effect on ineligibles. Taking into account that this was a time when the labor market was 
particularly buoyant, these seem to be quite large effects, although they were achieved with a 
replacement rate of 33–40 percent of average net earnings for the age group.  
The results also suggest that the impact of the EMA on participation actually increases 
in the following year. This result is important because it suggests that those who are induced Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 25 
into extra education do not find the courses unexpectedly difficult or uninteresting and are 
willing to stay for the full two years of the program. Importantly, about two-thirds of the 
initial increase in school participation is due to a decline in inactivity rather than in work. This 
reduces the implicit costs of the program because the forgone earnings for these individuals 
are zero. However, this may also mean that the program is attracting those with few other 
opportunities, as also demonstrated by the fact that the largest effect is among those with low 
prior achievement. The key policy question here is the extent to which this extra education is 
valuable to them. If the main mechanism by which the policy works is by alleviating liquidity 
constraints, then it would reinforce the view that those attracted into education by this policy 
would enjoy positive net returns. Among those eligible for a full award, the point estimate of 
the effect of the policy is larger for renters than for owner-occupiers. While this is consistent 
with some families facing credit constraints, the difference in the estimated impact of the 
policy is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance. Therefore 
the extent to which the impact of the policy is due to credit constraints, rather than an 
unconstrained price effect, remains unclear. 
The returns realized by those induced into staying on by the CCTs are not known. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence on how these returns and the future supply of educated 
workers may change now that the program has been rolled out nationally. This, of course, 
depends on many factors, not least the nature of the production function. These are all 
important research and policy questions that need to be investigated in the future.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 26 
Appendix 1 
Map of England Showing Location and Proximity of the Nine Urban Pilot 
and Nine Urban Control Areas Used in This Paper 
 
Note: This map was drawn using Geographic Information System (GIS) data from the Edina 
UK Borders data collection which provides digitized boundary data-sets of the UK (see 
http://www.edina.ac.uk/ukborders). Edina is the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) 
national academic data centre based at the University of Edinburgh.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 27 
Appendix 2 
Indicators Used in Each Deprivation Score 
Income  Adults in Income Support households (DSS) for 1998 
Children in Income Support households (DSS) for 1998 
Adults in Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance households (DSS) for 1998 
Children in Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance households (DSS) for 1998 
Adults in Family Credit households (DSS) for 1999 
Children in Family Credit households (DSS) for 1999 
Adults in Disability Working Allowance households (DSS) for 1999 
Children in Disability Working Allowance households (DSS) for 1999 
Non-earning, non-Income-Support pensioner, and disabled Council Tax 
Benefit recipients (DSS) for 1998 apportioned to wards 
Employment  Unemployment claimant counts (JUVOS, ONS) average of May 1998, August 
1998, November 1998, and February 1999 
People out of work but in TEC-delivered government-supported training 
(DfEE) 
People aged 18–24 on New Deal options (Employment Survey) 
Incapacity Benefit recipients aged 16–59 (DSS) for 1998 




Comparative mortality ratios for males and females at ages under 65; district-
level figures for 1997 and 1998 applied to constituent wards (ONS) 
People receiving Attendance Allowance or Disability Living Allowance 
(DSS) in 1998 as a proportion of all people 
Proportion of people of working age (16–59) receiving Incapacity Benefit or 
Severe Disablement Allowance (DSS) for 1998 and 1999 respectively 
Age- and sex-standardized ratio of limiting long-term illness (1991 Census) 




Working-age adults with no qualifications (three years’ aggregated LFS data 
at district level, modeled to ward level) for 1995–98 
Children aged 16 and over who are not in full-time education (Child Benefit 
data – DSS) for 1999 
Proportions of 17- to 19-year-old population who have not successfully 
applied for higher education (UCAS data) for 1997 and 1998 
Key Stage 2 primary-school performance data (DfEE, converted to ward-level 
estimates) for 1998 
Primary-school children with English as an additional language (DfEE) for 
1998 
Absenteeism at primary level (all absences, not just unauthorized) (DfEE) for 
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Housing  Homeless households in temporary accommodation (Local Authority HIP 
Returns) for 1997–98 
Household overcrowding (1991 Census) 
Poor private sector housing (modeled from 1996 English House Condition 




Access to a post office (General Post Office Counters) for April 1998 
Access to food shops (Data Consultancy) for 1998 
Access to a GP (NHS, BMA, and Scottish Health Service) for October 1997 
Access to a primary school (DfEE) for 1999 
Child 
poverty  
Percentage of children that live in families that claim means-tested benefits 
(Income Support, Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance, Family Credit, and 
Disability Working Allowance) 
Source: Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions 2001. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 29 
Appendix 3 
Sample Means 
 Whole  Sample  Pilot Areas  Control Areas 
Pilot area  0.661  1.000  0.000 
Fully eligible for the EMA  0.470  0.472  0.466 
Partially eligible for the EMA  0.308  0.308  0.306 
Not eligible for the EMA  0.223  0.220  0.228 
In full-time education Year 12  0.709  0.717  0.694 
In work Year 12  0.156  0.157  0.154 
Characteristics used in matching       
Male 0.504  0.503  0.504 
Weekly family income   389.01  387.50  391.95 
Family receives means-tested benefit  0.263  0.268  0.253 
Mother and father figure present  0.623  0.626  0.617 
Father figure present  0.753  0.753  0.753 
Father’s age (= 0 if absent)  30.096  30.301  29.696 
Mother’s age  39.859  39.867  39.843 
Owner-occupier 0.693  0.686  0.709 
Council or Housing Association   0.253  0.266  0.226 
Has statemented special needs  0.092  0.093  0.090 
Mother has A levels or higher  0.245  0.237  0.259 
Mother has O levels or equivalent  0.246  0.245  0.247 
Father has A levels or higher  0.221  0.220  0.223 
Father has O levels or equivalent  0.171  0.168  0.177 
Father manager or professional  0.166  0.163  0.172 
Father clerical or similar  0.243  0.246  0.238 
Mother manager or professional  0.129  0.121  0.144 
Mother clerical or similar  0.294  0.300  0.282 
Father variables missing  0.363  0.362  0.366 
One or two parents in work when born  0.831  0.825  0.843 
Attended two primary schools  0.254  0.256  0.251 
Attended more than two primary schools  0.076  0.077  0.073 
Received childcare as a child  0.911  0.915  0.903 
One set of grandparents around when child  0.326  0.320  0.337 
Two sets of grandparents around when child  0.448  0.466  0.413 
Grandparents provided care when child  0.316  0.307  0.332 
Ill between 0 and 1  0.223  0.225  0.219 
Number of older siblings  0.941  0.928  0.968 
Number of younger siblings  0.975  0.979  0.968 
Older sibling educated to 18  0.291  0.286  0.299 
White 0.896  0.892  0.903 
Father in full-time work  0.503  0.504  0.502 Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 30 
Father in part-time work  0.021  0.019  0.025 
Mother in full-time work  0.335  0.327  0.350 
Mother in part-time work  0.309  0.312  0.304 
Math GCSE score  4.233  4.232  4.235 
English GCSE score  3.810  3.798  3.834 
GCSE score missing  0.129  0.131  0.126 
      
Number of observations   6,838  4,518  2,320 Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 31 
Appendix 4 
Probability of Attrition between Wave 1 and Wave 2 
  Marginal Effect Standard Error 
Partially eligible for the EMA  –0.002  0.024 
Fully eligible for the EMA  –0.039  0.015 
Pilot area  +0.005  0.012 
Male   +0.019  0.011 
Weekly family income  +0.000  0.000 
Family receives means-tested benefit  –0.014  0.017 
Mother and father figure present  –0.015  0.032 
Father figure present  –0.028  0.021 
Owner-occupier –0.085  0.025 
Council or Housing Association   –0.031  0.023 
Has statemented special needs  –0.001  0.018 
Mother’s age  –0.002  0.001 
Father’s age  –0.001  0.001 
Mother has A levels or higher  +0.001  0.017 
Mother has O levels or equivalent  +0.001  0.014 
Father has A levels or higher  –0.065  0.018 
Father has O levels or equivalent  –0.022  0.017 
Father manager or professional  –0.014  0.021 
Father clerical or similar  +0.017  0.016 
Mother manager or professional  –0.029  0.020 
Mother clerical or similar  –0.014  0.013 
Father variables missing  –0.015  0.036 
One or two parents in work when born  –0.011  0.016 
Attended two primary schools  –0.021  0.012 
Attended more than two primary schools  +0.030  0.021 
Received childcare as a child  +0.002  0.019 
One set of grandparents around when child  –0.008  0.015 
Two sets of grandparents around when child  +0.004  0.016 
Grandparents provided care when child  +0.007  0.012 
Ill between 0 and 1  +0.010  0.013 
Number of older siblings  +0.017  0.006 
Number of younger siblings  –0.010  0.005 
Older sibling educated to 18  –0.036  0.013 
White –0.020  0.022 
Father in full-time work  +0.033  0.020 
Father in part-time work  –0.004  0.039 
Mother in full-time work  –0.002  0.017 
Mother in part-time work  –0.030  0.015 
Measures of local deprivation     Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 32 
Income   –0.001  0.002 
Employment –0.007  0.003 
Health deprivation and disability  +0.033  0.020 
Education, skills, and training  +0.023  0.011 
Housing +0.010  0.012 
Geographical access to services  +0.004  0.014 
Child poverty   +0.002  0.001 
Percent not staying on post-16   –0.002  0.001 
Percent not going to university  –0.002  0.002 
Class sizes in 1999   –0.003  0.002 
Authorized absences   +0.000  0.004 
Percent getting five GCSEs A–C in 1999  +0.001  0.001 
Percent getting no GCSEs A–G in 1999  +0.001  0.001 
School has sixth form   –0.002  0.013 
Distance to nearest Year 12 provider  +0.000  0.000 
Math GCSE score  –0.014  0.006 
English GCSE score  –0.015  0.005 
GCSE score missing  –0.003  0.025 
     
Number of observations  6,838 
Observed probability  0.253 Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 33 
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Tables 
Table 1 










Variant 1  £30  Young person  £50  £50 
Variant 2  £40  Young person  £50  £50 
Variant 3  £30  Primary carer
a  £50  £50 
Variant 4  £30  Young person  £80  £140 
a.
 Usually the mother. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 40 
Table 2 
Pre-Reform Neighborhood Characteristics of Pilot and Control Areas 
  Pilot Areas  Control Areas  All England
a 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of observations  4,518  2,320  8,414 
             
Measures of local deprivation 
(index)             
Multiple deprivation score
b 38.36  17.00 37.05  18.64 21.70  15.39 
Income
b 30.14  11.79 29.93  13.62 18.86  11.31 
Employment
b 16.66  6.23 16.38  7.14 10.19  6.49 
Health deprivation and 
disability
b 1.04  0.58 0.97  0.68 0.00  0.92 
Education, skills, and 
training
b 0.78  0.98 0.70  0.82 0.00  0.87 
Housing
b 0.47  0.83 0.34  1.00 0.00  0.92 
Child poverty
b 43.78  17.12 42.70  19.61 26.74  17.02 
          
Education dropout rates in 
1998          
Percent dropping out of 
education at 16
c  38.9   35.8   30.0  
Percent staying on in 
education
d  69.15  8.99 66.63  10.50    
          
Nearest-school  data          
Class sizes in 1999   21.43  2.29 21.41  2.23    
Average authorized 
absences (days per year)  8.69  1.99 8.86  2.63    
Percent getting five GCSEs
e 
A*–C in 1999  35.35  17.72 35.48  15.82    
Percent getting no GCSEs
e 
A*–G in 1999  6.93  5.09 6.54  6.08    
School has sixth form
f 0.45  0.50 0.34  0.47    
Distance to nearest Year 12 
provider  (meters)  1,630.7 1,051.1  1,951.6 1,480.8     
a. The all-England data are calculated on the basis of ward-level data (small subdivisions of 
municipalities). There are 8,414 wards in England. 
b. A higher score indicates a higher incidence of deprivation. Scores across different measures 
are not comparable. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 41 
c. These data are taken from official LEA-based calculations of 16-year-old stay-on rates in 
1998 (Department for Education and Skills 2005), weighted by the sample populations. 
(Weighting is necessary, as in two of the control LEAs, half as many individuals as in the 
other control LEAs were sampled.) 
d. These data are calculated by looking at the number of 17-, 18-, and 19-year-olds in receipt 
of Child Benefit divided by the number of 13-, 14-, and 15-year-olds receiving the benefit in 
the local area (ward). Child Benefit is payable for all children under 16 and all those over 16 
in secondary education. It has nearly 100 percent take-up. As very few 19-year-olds are in 
secondary – rather than tertiary – education, this figure is an underestimate (by about a third) 
of the proportion of young people staying in post-compulsory education and should be 
understood as a proxy for this figure.  
e. GCSE exams are taken in the last year of compulsory education (Year 11) and are graded 
A* to G. The government has a target for at least 60 percent of 16-year-olds nationwide, and 
at least 30 percent of pupils in all schools, to achieve five GCSEs at grades A* to C by 2008. 
f. The sixth form is the two years of post-compulsory schooling, Years 12 and 13. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 42 
Table 3 


















All       
Full-time education  69.2 +3.9 +4.4 +4.6 +4.5 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (1.4) (1.4) (1.8) (1.3) 
Work/Training    16.4 –0.4 –1.7 –1.6 –1.5 
(Standard error)  (0.6)  (1.1) (1.3) (1.1) (1.2) 
NEET  14.5 –3.5 –2.7 –3.0 –3.0 
(Standard error)  (0.6)  (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (0.8) 
Pilot sample size  3,524  3,524  3,518  3,518  3,518 
Control sample size  n/a  1,791  1,791  1,791  1,791 
Total sample size  3,524  5,315  5,309  5,309  5,309 
       
Males       
Full-time education  66.4 +5.3 +4.8 +4.6 +5.0 
(Standard error)  (1.1)  (2.0) (2.1) (2.5) (2.0) 
Work/Training    19.7 –1.5 –2.9 –2.3 –2.5 
(Standard error)  (1.0)  (1.6) (1.9) (1.7) (2.0) 
NEET  13.9 –3.8 –1.8 –2.3 –2.4 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (1.5) (1.5) (1.8) (1.4) 
Pilot sample size  1,753 1,753 1,747 1,747 1,747 
Control sample size  n/a 900 900 900 900 
Total sample size  1,753 2,653 2,647 2,647 2,647 
       
Females       
Full-time education  71.9 +2.5 +4.1 +4.6 +4.0 
(Standard error)  (1.1)  (1.9) (2.0) (2.5) (1.7) 
Work/Training    13.0 +0.7 –0.5 –0.9 –0.4 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (1.4) (1.7) (1.3) (1.4) 
NEET  15.1 –3.2 –3.6 –3.7 –3.6 
(Standard error)  (0.9)  (1.5) (1.8) (2.0) (0.9) 
Pilot sample size  1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771 
Control sample size  n/a 891 891 891 891 
Total sample size  1,771  2,662  2,662 2,662 2,662 
Notes: The kernel matching estimate uses an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06. 
All standard errors allow for clustering at LEA level. For the OLS case, analytical standard 
errors are used. For all other methods, the block bootstrap based on 250 replications is used. Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 43 
Common support is imposed throughout, although very few observations are ever dropped (as 
shown by the reported sample sizes). Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 44 
Table 4 






















A l l         
Two years’ education  61.0 +5.2 +6.2 +6.1 +6.8 +6.7 
(Standard error)  (0.9)  (1.7) (1.8) (2.3) (2.4) (1.3) 
One year’s education  16.0 –1.1 –1.8 –0.6 –2.1 –1.7 
(Standard error)  (0.7)  (1.3) (1.6) (0.6) (1.2) (1.3) 
No  years’  education  23.0 –4.1 –4.4 –5.5 –4.7 –5.0 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (1.5) (1.6) (1.9) (2.0) (1.2) 
Pilot  sample  size  2,537 2,537 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506 
Control  sample  size n/a 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297 1,297 
Total  sample  size 2,537 3,834 3,803 3,803 3,803 3,803 
        
Males        
Two years’ education  58.6 +8.7 +8.1 +5.9 +7.3 +7.4 
(Standard error)  (1.1)  (2.4) (2.6) (3.2) (3.3) (2.1) 
One year’s education  15.2 –3.4 –3.6 –0.5 –3.1 –2.9 
(Standard error)  (1.0)  (1.8) (2.2) (0.8) (1.7) (1.7) 
No  years’  education  26.3 –5.3 –4.5 –5.4 –4.2 –4.6 
(Standard error)  (1.3)  (2.2) (2.4) (2.8) (2.8) (1.7) 
Pilot sample size  1,234 1,234 1,211 1,211 1,211 1,211 
Control sample size  n/a 636 636 636 636 636 
Total sample size  1,234 1,870 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,847 
        
Females        
Two years’ education  63.2 +1.8 +4.4 +6.2 +6.3 +5.9 
(Standard error)  (1.3)  (2.3) (2.6) (3.3) (3.4) (1.5) 
One year’s education  16.9 +1.0 –0.0 –0.7 –1.2 –0.5 
(Standard error)  (1.0)  (1.8) (2.3) (1.0) (1.7) (1.9) 
No  years’  education  19.9 –2.8 –4.4 –5.6 –5.1 –5.4 
(Standard error)  (1.1)  (1.9) (2.2) (2.6) (2.8) (1.6) 
Pilot sample size  1,303 1,303 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 
Control sample size  n/a 661 661 661 661 661 
Total sample size  1,303 1,964 1,956 1,956 1,956 1,956 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 45 
Table 5 
Impact of the EMA on Year 12 Destinations: All Young People by Eligibility  




















All            
Full-time education  67.2 +6.7  72.1 +1.2  80.8 +0.7 
(Standard error)  (1.0)  (1.7)  (1.2)  (1.8)  (1.2) (1.7) 
Work/Training   15.5  –1.5  17.7  –1.4  13.5  +1.3 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (1.5)  (1.0)  (1.8)  (1.1) (1.9) 
NEET 17.3  –5.2  10.1  +0.2  5.7  –1.9 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (1.3)  (0.8)  (1.2)  (0.7) (1.2) 
Pilot sample size  2,131 2,122  1,393 1,372  994  927 
Control sample size  n/a 1,080  n/a  711  n/a  529 
Total sample size  2,131 3,202  1,393 2,083  994 1,456 
            
Males            
Full-time education  66.2 +6.7  66.7 +4.0  75.2 +3.2 
(Standard error)  (1.5)  (2.5)  (1.8)  (2.9)  (1.9) (3.0) 
Work/Training   18.5  –0.7  21.6  –6.5  18.4  +0.1 
(Standard error)  (1.2)  (2.2)  (1.6)  (2.7)  (1.7) (3.6) 
NEET 15.3  –6.0  11.7  +2.5  6.3  –3.4 
(Standard error)  (1.1)  (1.7)  (1.2)  (1.5)  (1.1) (1.9) 
Pilot sample size  1,060 1,051  693  683  521  494 
Control sample size  n/a 539  n/a 361  n/a 270 
Total sample size  1,060 1,590  693 1,044  521  764 
            
Females            
Full-time education  68.2  +6.8  77.6  –1.6  86.9  –2.2 
(Standard error)  (1.4)  (2.3)  (1.6)  (2.2)  (1.6) (1.8) 
Work/Training   12.5  –2.3  13.9  +3.6  8.0  +2.5 
(Standard error)  (1.0)  (1.5)  (1.3)  (2.4)  (1.3) (1.8) 
NEET 19.3  –4.4  8.6  –2.1  5.1  –0.3 
(Standard error)  (1.2)  (1.9)  (1.1)  (1.9)  (1.0) (1.4) 
Pilot sample size  1,071 1,071  700  689  473  433 
Control sample size  n/a 541  n/a 350  n/a 259 
Total sample size  1,071 1,612  700 1,039  473  692 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 46 
Table 6 
Impact of the EMA on Year 12 Destinations of Those Fully Eligible for the EMA, by Prior 
Academic Achievement 










All      
Full-time education  65.2 +9.2 85.1 +1.0 
(Standard error)  (1.6)  (2.6)  (1.3)  (1.9) 
Work/Training    19.5 –2.2  9.5 –1.3 
(Standard error)  (1.3)  (2.9)  (1.0)  (1.6) 
NEET 15.3  –7.0  5.5  +0.4 
(Standard error)  (1.2)  (3.0)  (0.8)  (1.3) 
Pilot sample size  909 876 803 747 
Control sample size  n/a 435  n/a 421 
Total sample size  909 1,311  803 1,168 
      
Males      
Full-time education  62.9 +6.0 86.1 +1.0 
(Standard error)  (2.2)  (3.4)  (1.8)  (2.3) 
Work/Training    23.7 –0.3 10.1 –1.0 
(Standard error)  (2.0)  (3.1)  (1.6)  (2.4) 
NEET 13.4  –5.7  3.8  +0.0 
(Standard error)  (1.6)  (2.6)  (1.0)  (1.5) 
Pilot sample size  464 437 366 315 
Control sample size  n/a 218  n/a 196 
Total sample size  464 655 366 511 
      
Females      
Full-time education 67.6  +12.3  84.2  +1.0 
(Standard error)  (2.2)  (3.9)  (1.7)  (2.9) 
Work/Training    15.1 –4.0  8.9 –1.6 
(Standard error)  (1.7)  (4.9)  (1.4)  (2.1) 
NEET 17.3  –8.3  6.9  +0.6 
(Standard error)  (1.8)  (5.3)  (1.2)  (2.1) 
Pilot sample size  445 439 437 432 
Control sample size  n/a 217  n/a 225 
Total sample size  445 656 437 657 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 47 
Table 7 
Impact of the EMA on Year 12 Destinations of Those Fully Eligible for the EMA, by Housing 
Tenure 










All      
Full-time education 58.0 +9.1 77.5 +3.8 
(Standard error)  (1.5) (3.0) (1.3) (2.2) 
Work/Training    17.5 –2.6 13.3 –2.0 
(Standard error)  (1.1) (2.2) (1.1) (1.9) 
NEET  24.6 –6.5  9.2 –1.8 
(Standard error)  (1.3) (2.0) (0.9) (1.4) 
Pilot sample size  1,123 1,096 1,008  984 
Control sample size  n/a 512  n/a 518 
Total sample size  1,123 1,608 1,008 1,502 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3.  Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir 48 
 
Notes 
1. See, among many others, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Krueger and Lindahl (2001), and 
Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006). 
2. See Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). 
3. See Gosling, Machin, and Meghir (2000). 
4. See Table A1.2a, page 43 of OECD (2008). In the US, students may drop out of school if 
they have reached the age set in their state’s law for the end of compulsory schooling, which 
ranges between 16 and 18, but dropouts are not considered to have completed school and no 
certificate or award is issued at this stage. The US status dropout rate is currently 9.3 percent 
(see Laird et al. (2008) Table 6), but the methods for calculating official graduation and 
dropout rates have been challenged recently in a number of studies and the true figure is likely 
to be closer to 25 percent – see, for example, Heckman and LaFontaine (2007). 
5. See Goldin (1999). 
6. Compulsory schooling ends by law at age 16 in 30 states, at age 17 in nine states, and at age 
18 in 11 states plus the District of Columbia (see US Department of Education, International 
Affairs Staff (2005), page13).  
7. See Table C.2.1, page 343 of OECD (2008).  
8. See, for example, Harmon and Walker (1995), who exploit the changes in the compulsory 
school-leaving age in Britain to estimate the returns to schooling, Goldin (1999), who 
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examines the 1910 to 1940 reforms in the US, and Meghir and Palme (2005), who examine 
the effects of increased compulsory schooling and abolition of selective education in Sweden. 
9. See Schultz (2004) and Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2007). 
10. See Attanasio et al. (2006). 
11. See, for example, Rawlings and Rubio (2005). 
12. See Dearden and Heath (1996). 
13. See the press release associated with the launch of this program, at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2008a/pr102-08.html.  
14. The UK government announced on 6 November 2007 that, from 2015, all children will 
have to remain in some form of education or training until the age of 18. This policy will run 
alongside EMAs – see Department for Children, Schools, and Families (2007). 
15. With respect to dropping out at 16, following the GCSE qualification which is obtained at 
that age, the then Minister for Lifelong Learning, Margaret Hodge, stated in Parliament: ‘The 
real challenge is to increase the number of young people achieving two A-levels. That comes 
under our schools agenda – our 14 to 19 agenda. A particular problem is the haemorrhaging of 
young people, who achieve five A to Cs at GCSE level and then do not stay on to do further 
education full time’ (House of Commons Hansard Debates for 5 July 2001, column 391). A 
survey of government policy by Johnson (2004) also highlights this concern.  
16. Todd and Wolpin (2003) estimate a model of educational choice and fertility using the 
control villages from the PROGRESA experiment in Mexico. They then validate their model 
by testing whether it is capable of predicting the outcomes induced by the experiment. Meghir 
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(1996) estimates the incentive effect of wages on education in Thailand. A 10 percent increase 
in the wage, which represents an increase in the opportunity cost of schooling, reduces school 
participation by children on average by 1 percent. His results are described in Tzannatos 
(2003).  
17. See Schultz (2004). 
18. See Attanasio et al. (2006). 
19. Interestingly, Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2007) show the importance of direct 
evidence and demonstrate that the implied monetary incentives provided by a CCT can have 
much larger effects than those induced by equivalent changes in labour market wages. Other 
related papers include Dynarski (2003), who examines the impact of incentives for college 
attendance and completion in the US, Angrist and Lavy (forthcoming), who use a randomised 
experiment to assess the sensitivity to monetary incentives for obtaining a high-school 
graduation certificate in Israel, and Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2006), who use a 
randomised trial at a Canadian university to examine the impact of increased financial 
incentives, increased non-financial support, and both increased financial and non-financial 
support on educational outcomes. 
20. ‘We recognise that for some people there are financial barriers to participating in 
education, particularly for those from lower income households’ 
(http://info.emasys1.dfes.gov.uk/control.asp?region=partners&page=general).  
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21. Papers exploring whether or not liquidity constraints are important for educational 
outcomes include Keane and Wolpin (1997), Cameron and Heckman (1998), Cameron and 
Taber (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), and Dale and Krueger (2002). 
22. ‘Local education authorities’ is the term for school districts in the UK. 
23. The UK compulsory schooling system is based on 12 years: age 4 (Reception) through to 
age 16 (Year 11). Participation at ages 17 and 18 (Year 12 and Year 13) is currently voluntary 
but is also provided free at the point of use in state institutions and is generally necessary for 
immediate entry into higher education. 
24. Data are also available from a second cohort, who became eligible for the payment from 
September 2000. These are not included in the analysis as there is a chance that the academic 
outcomes in Year 11 of this cohort may have been influenced by the announcement of the 
program, whereas this is not so for the first cohort because of the timing of the announcement. 
Only urban areas are considered as it was only in these areas that all four variants were 
piloted. Full results for all cohorts and rural areas are available from the authors.  
25. Income is defined as the taxable income of the biological or adoptive parents in the 
previous tax year. 
26. This bonus was paid to the child in all variants (including variant 3).  
27. This was not true for the second cohort; for this reason, it is excluded from the analysis. It 
is important to control for student ability; the only measures available relate to school 
outcomes in Year 11. 
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28. This was done using data from the British Youth Cohort Studies. The nine pilot LEAs 
used in this study are Bolton, Doncaster, Gateshead, Middlesbrough, Nottingham, Oldham, 
Southampton, Stoke-on-Trent, and Walsall. The nine control LEAs are Blackburn, Blackpool, 
Derby, Newcastle, Portsmouth, Redcar & Cleveland, Rochdale, Rotherham, and Stockton-on-
Tees. The remaining six pilot areas – all of which had variant 1 of the EMA (see Table 1) – 
were Cornwall, Leeds, and four parts of South London (Lambeth, Southwark, Lewisham, and 
Greenwich). Data from Cornwall are excluded from the analysis in this paper due to this being 
a very rural part of England and it therefore being more difficult to make valid comparisons 
(even to Devon and Norfolk, which were the specially chosen control areas for Cornwall). 
Comparable data were not collected in either Leeds or the four areas of South London, as in 
the original design there was meant to be a randomised trial in these areas, which was 
abandoned at the very last minute.  
29. The neighbourhood data used were based at ward level, which can cover from as few as 
400 people to as many as 30,000 people, but usually between 5,000 and 7,000 individuals. 
There are 8,414 wards in England. 
30. These are based on government benefit figures and are produced annually by Oxford 
University. 
31. Address grid references for every child in the survey as well as for every Year 11 school in 
the country were used. These allowed the identification of the nearest (as the crow flies) 
comprehensive Year 11 school for every child in the survey. Publicly available pre-reform 
quality measures for that school were then mapped in.  
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32. A number of studies have shown that distance to school is an important determinant of 
educational decisions (Card 1995 and 1999). 
33. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). 
34. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for the role of the propensity score and Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1997) for the importance of ensuring common support. 
35. The reported matching estimate uses an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06. A 
number of different methods of matching, including Epanechnikov kernels with a variety of 
bandwidths, nearest neighbour matching, and Mahalanobis-metric matching method, were 
tested and an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06 always gave the best results 
(based on the various covariance balancing indicators used). 
36. Note that most of the regressors are discrete and a number of interactions are included. 
This means that the OLS approach is close to being non-parametric discrete choice by 
estimating probabilities within cells. Obviously, not all possible interactions were included 
(there would be far too many), but the results imply that the parametric restrictions imposed 
are not restrictive. This is clearly demonstrated by comparing to the propensity score method. 
See the work of Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005) on this issue. 
37. See Department for Education and Skills (2005). 
38. The LEA is used as the definition of the block/cluster. In addition, the stratification into 
pilot and control areas is respected when drawing the bootstrap samples. The reader might be 
interested to know that with nine pilot areas and nine control areas, there are (
17C9)
2 = 
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590,976,100 possible different clustered samples with replacement that respect the 
stratification (Wang 1955).  
39. This is the average of the three estimates, and corresponds to the fully interacted OLS 
estimate. To avoid confusion, only the results of the fully interacted linear regression (OLS) 
model are reported in all the text that follows. 
40. The baseline figure is different from the aggregate figure for a number of reasons. First, 
the population is different. Second, the age window that the aggregate figure looks at is 
different since the aggregate figure works with age and not with school years as is done here. 
Thus the aggregate figure relates to slightly older persons. Finally, there may have been 
differential non-response between participants and non-participants. Note, however, that there 
is no evidence that the non-response is different between pilots and controls. In fact, the 
results on attrition in Appendix 4 imply that any non-response will be balanced between pilots 
and controls.  
41. In earlier versions of this paper, those who stayed on for only one year in Year 12 and then 
left in Year 13 and those who studied for one year in Year 13 having left in Year 12 were 
considered separately. But the number of individuals falling into this second category was so 
small that it was decided to simplify the analysis by combining the two groups. This also 
allowed an ordered probit model to be used to check the sensitivity of the preferred estimation 
approach.  
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42. For males, 5.1 percentage points with a standard error of 1.8, compared to the estimate of 
5.0 percentage points for the full sample. For females, 4.3 percentage points with a standard 
error of 1.5, compared to the estimate of 4.0 percentage points for the full sample. 
43. This estimate has a standard error of 1.9, which is calculated using a block bootstrap with 
500 replications.  
44. According to pages 177–8 of Johnson (2004), ‘The UK has a relatively low staying-on rate 
in full time education after age 16. Given high returns this is, perhaps, surprising and probably 
economically inefficient. Given very substantial differences in staying-on rates by social 
background, it is also of concern from an equity point of view’. 
45. Prior achievement is based on grades obtained in GCSE Maths and English exams that all 
students had to sit in Year 11. Each grade in these exams was given a score of 0 to 8 and then 
they were added together to obtain a score out of 16. High-ability children had a score of 9 or 
above, just under half of the sample of those eligible for a full EMA award.  
46. See Becker (1991). 
47. See Becker (1991) and Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992). 
48. See Zeldes (1989). 
49. The housing status is measured at baseline and cannot be affected by the program. 
50. See Oreopoulos (2007). 
51. All of the results cited in this section are available from the authors on request. 
52. The standard error allows for clustering at the family level. 
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53. Results for the split between paid work and NEET for the second year are available on 
request.  
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++ ∑∑  is found, where EMAt is the annual average CCT 
allowing for the fact that not all those eligible receive a full award (this average is estimated to 
be £900 a year – £25 a week for 30 weeks plus £150 in bonuses) and p is the proportion in 
full-time education eligible for the EMA (estimated to be 75.2 percent). α t is the proportion 
drawn from paid employment at time t, which is estimated to be one-third for t = 0 (Year 12) 
and two-thirds for t = 1 (Year 13). λ  is the increase in participation in education (estimated to 
be 6.7 percentage points from Table 4). Ct is the marginal cost of those brought into education 
as a result of the EMA and wt represents the estimated life-cycle wage profile based on the 
2002–03 Family Resources Survey. Real growth in future wages of 2 percent a year is 
assumed. R is the discount rate and is assumed to be 3½ percent, which is the recommended 
discount rate in the UK HM Treasury Green Book (http://greenbook.treasury.gov.uk/).  
55. See table 7 of Department for Education and Skills (2003). The precise marginal cost is 
hard to quantify since one would want to keep quality constant; therefore the average 
expenditure per pupil is taken as the measure. 
56. See Dearden, McGranahan, and Sianesi (2004). 
57. Feinstein and Sabates (2005) find some evidence that the EMA led to a reduction in the 
number of convictions of young men for both burglary and theft. 